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THE UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES: OREGON JOINS UP
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER*
Uniform perpetuity reform is on the march, and Oregon has
joined the parade. On January 1, 1990, the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities (Uniform Act)' became effective in Ore-
gon.2 Although promulgated only three years ago, the Uniform
Act has been enacted in over twenty percent of the states3 and ap-
pears to be on its way toward enactment in several others.
* Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Chicago. The author served as the Reporter for the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities. Copyright © 1990 by Lawrence W. Waggoner
1. 8A U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Uniform Act].
2. S.B. 297, 1989 Or. Laws ch. 208 §§ 1-10 (1989), codified at ORS 105.950-.975
[hereinafter Oregon enactment]. Enactment of Senate Bill 297 was supported by the Ore-
gon State Bar Estate Planning and Administration Section and by the Oregon State Bar
Real Estate and Land Use Section.
3. In addition to Oregon, the other enacting states, to date, are Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and South
Carolina. 1989 Conn. Acts No. 44; FLA. STAT. § 689.225 (1988); 1990 Ga. Laws -; 1989
Mass. Acts No. 668; MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 554.71-554.78 (1989); MINN. STAT.
§§ 501A.01 to 501A.07 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-801 to -807 (1989); 1989 Neb.
Laws. 377; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.103-111.1035 (Michie 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-
6-10 to -70 (1989).
The Uniform Act is endorsed by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion (on the recommendation of the Council of the A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Pro-
bate and Trust Law), the Board of Regents of the American College of Probate Counsel,
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Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Act, Oregon followed the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities (common-law Rule).4
Noted for its unjust consequences, the common-law Rule disre-
gards actual events and invalidates a contingent (nonvested) future
interest merely on the grounds of what might happen. Regardless
of what actually happens, an interest is invalid at common law if it
is not certain to vest (or terminate) within twenty-one years after
the death of a life in being at the creation of the interest.
Oregon practitioners and their clients will appreciate the fact
that the Uniform Act not only eliminates the unjust consequences
of the common-law Rule but also eliminates wasteful perpetuity lit-
igation. Most of all, perhaps, Oregon practitioners will appreciate
the fact that the Act does not require them to learn a complicated
new scheme of perpetuity law.
I. OVERALL DESIGN OF THE UNIFORM ACT
In overall design, the Uniform Act achieves its several objec-
tives by employing the so-called wait-and-see/deferred-reformation
strategy of perpetuity reform.' The Act contains three principal
features insofar as donative transfers are concerned.
6
A. Preservation of Common-Law Validity
The common-law Rule has two sides - a validating side and
an invalidating side. Injustice under the common-law Rule flows
from the invalidating side. Under the validating side, a contingent
(nonvested) interest is valid from the moment of creation if it is
the Board of Governors of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, and the Joint
Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code.
The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code also has voted to make the
Uniform Act an official part of the Uniform Probate Code as Part 9 of Article II.
On March 8, 1990, the California Law Revision Commission voted to adopt a tenta-
tive recommendation for enactment of the Uniform Act in California, enactment also is
supported by the Executive Committee of the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Section
of the State Bar of California.
4. See Paulus, Future Interests in Oregon, 15 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 151, 170-74
(1979), for a review of Oregon perpetuity cases.
5. Oregon practitioners and judges will find that the Official Comments to the Uni-
form Act contain a detailed, authoritative discussion of the Act, with illustrations. A less-
detailed but still helpful section-by-section analysis is contained in Waggoner, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569, 591-602 (1986).
6. Another principal feature of the Act is that it exempts commercial transactions
from the Rule Against Perpetuities.
[Vol. 26:259
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then certain to vest or terminate within twenty-one years after the
death of an individual then alive.
The Uniform Act continues the validating side of the com-
mon-law Rule. The Act sustains the validity of trusts or other
property arrangements that satisfy the common-law Rule.7 Put dif-
ferently, the Act does not impose a perpetuity scheme discordant
with accepted common-law practice.
Because of this central feature, considerable benefits accrue to
trusts or other property arrangements that satisfy the common-law
Rule. A straightforward benefit is that, from the moment of crea-
tion, the property arrangement is valid under the Act. In our mo-
bile society, this is a significant benefit. For example, a
testamentary trust drawn by an Oregon lawyer in compliance with
accepted common-law practice not only will be valid in Oregon but
also will be valid if the client dies domiciled in (or owns land cov-
ered by the trust in) a common-law jurisdiction. Conversely, a tes-
tamentary trust drawn in compliance with accepted common-law
practice by a lawyer in a common-law jurisdiction also will be valid
if the client dies domiciled in (or owns land covered by the trust in)
Oregon or any other state that has adopted the Act.
Compliance with the common-law Rule confers another very
attractive benefit: It renders the trust or other property arrange-
ment invulnerable to any possible future reformation suit under the
Act's deferred-reformation feature. Only interests whose validity is
governed by the wait-and-see element are vulnerable to reformation
under the Act. Reformation is never necessary - or permitted -
for dispositions that are valid initially under the common-law
Rule.'
In estate-planning practice, then, every incentive remains to
comply with the common-law Rule, through the use of a standard
perpetuity saving clause, if appropriate, or one tailored to the par-
ticular trust or property arrangement. Oregon practitioners who
successfully draft for initial validity, as most do by far, can con-
tinue with business as usual. They need not learn a new and com-
plicated scheme of perpetuity law and they need not make any
adjustment in their forms or practice.9
7. Uniform Act, supra note 1, §§ l(a)(l), l(b)(l), l(c)(1); Oregon enactment, supra
note 2, §§ I(l)(a), ](2)(a), l(3)(a).
8. Uniform Act, supra note 1, § 3; Oregon enactment, supra note 2, § 3.
9. Though not required by the Uniform Act, an adjustment to current practice that
has fallen into use under the Act in some quarters is to adjust the standard perpetuity
1990]
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B. Easy-to-Administer Wait-and-See Element
Injustice under the common-law Rule flows from its invalidat-
ing side. To eliminate that injustice, the Uniform Act alters the
invalidating side by installing a workable wait-and-see element. To
be sure, in the overall scheme of things, the wait-and-see element
will apply infrequently. Most trusts or other property arrange-
ments are initially valid and will continue to be drafted for initial
validity under the Act. Only the somewhat exceptional case of a
failure to ensure initial validity brings into play the wait-and-see
element.
Wait-and-see is a salvage strategy for trusts or other property
arrangements that would have been invalid at common law.
Rather than invalidating such interests at creation (the result at
common law), wait-and-see allows a period of time, called the per-
missible vesting period, during which the contingencies are permit-
ted to work out harmlessly.10 Estate planners will notice that the
wait-and-see strategy works in the nature of a perpetuity saving
clause. Like a perpetuity saving clause, the wait-and-see strategy
performs a margin-of-safety function. Wait-and-see in effect sup-
plies a perpetuity saving clause to trusts or other property arrange-
ments that failed to contain one in the first place.
Under the Uniform Act, the permissible vesting period is
ninety years. Prior to the Act, conventional wisdom assumed that
the permissible vesting period had to be measured on a case-by-case
basis by using actual measuring lives (all of whom must have been
in being at the creation of the interest) plus twenty-one years. Spe-
cifically, under the actual-measuring-lives approach, a group of per-
sons - called the measuring lives - is identified. Once the group
is identified, the lives of all its members are traced to see which one
outlives the others and when that survivor dies. The permissible
vesting period extends twenty-one years beyond the death of that
last surviving measuring life.
From its inception, the actual-measuring-lives approach has
saving clause to provide for termination at the later of (1) 21 years after the death of the
last surviving beneficiary in being when the trust was created, or (2) the expiration of any
fixed period of years allowed by applicable law. Such a clause should not be used, however,
in exercising a nongeneral power of appointment created in a "pre-1986" "grandfathered"
irrevocable trust under the federal generation-skipping tax. See Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B)(2) (1988).
10. Uniform Act, supra note 1, §§ 1(a)(2), 1(b)(2), 1(c)(2); Oregon enactment, supra
note 2, §§ l(l)(b), 1(2)(b), 1(3)(b).
[Vol. 26:259
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been plagued by several problems, not the least of which was how
to identify the measuring lives in individual cases." No satisfac-
tory method ever emerged. Academic controversies raged over the
issue. Rival methods were advanced. One method specified the
measuring lives by a formula - those having a "causal relation-
ship" to the vesting or failure of the interest in question. Because
the meaning of "causal relationship" and its application to individ-
ual cases is uncertain,12 that method is a litigation breeder 13 and
was found unsatisfactory.' 4 Another method specified the measur-
ing lives by statutory list - such as the transferor, the beneficiaries
of the disposition, and the beneficiaries' parents and grandpar-
ents. ' 5 Because a statutory list must apply to a virtually unimagin-
able variety of dispositions, the statutory-list method also was
found unsatisfactory. An ambiguity-free formulation of the statu-
tory-list method would have necessitated an exceedingly complex
set of statutory provisions.' 6
By abandoning the use of actual measuring lives and using in-
11. Another problem plaguing the actual-measuring-lives approach was that of trac-
ing. No matter how the measuring lives were to be identified, the lives of those actual
individuals would have to be traced to determine which one was the longest survivor and
when he or she died.
The tracing and identification problems were exacerbated by the premise, seemingly
accepted under both methods, that the measuring lives cannot always remain a static
group, assembled once and for all at the beginning. Instead, individuals who were once
measuring lives must be dropped from the group if certain events happen (such as the
individual's divorce, adoption out of the family, or assignment of his or her beneficial inter-
est to another); conversely, individuals who were not among the initial group of measuring
lives must be included later if certain events happen (such as marriage, adoption into the
family, or receipt of another's beneficial interest by assignment or succession) and if they
were living when the interest in question was created. This instability within the group of
measuring lives heightens the potential for wasteful litigation at one point or another dur-
ing the running of the permissible vesting period.
12. The point is developed in Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1985).
13. The litigation-breeding character of the "causal-relationship" formula is demon-
strated by the recent Rhode Island case of Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Colt, 529 A.2d 122 (R.I.
1987), where litigation arose some 66 years into the term of a trust to determine who the
measuring lives were under a causal-relationship-type wait-and-see statute. The trust in the
Colt case was upheld, but there would have been no need for the wasteful litigation had the
case been governed by the Uniform Act. Tfle Act's permissible vesting period is measured
by a flat period of years rather than by reference to "causal-relation" lives plus 21 years.
14. Nevada had a causal-relationship statute prior to repealing it and enacting the
Uniform Act.
15. A similar list is set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative
Transfers) § 1.3(2) (1983).
16. A draft of such a set of statutory provisions was prepared for the consideration of,
but not adopted by, the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Act. The draft is set forth in
HeinOnline  -- 26 Willamette L. Rev. 263 1989-1990
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stead a permissible vesting period of a flat ninety years,17 the Uni-
form Act overcame the difficulties previously associated with the
actual-measuring-lives approach. The ninety years is not an arbi-
trarily derived period. It is designed to represent a reasonable ap-
proximation of the average period of time reached were actual
measuring lives to have been used,18 which also coincides with an
approximation of the average margin-of-safety period provided by
standard perpetuity saving clauses.' 9
The use of a flat period of years eliminates the clutter that
previously plagued the wait-and-see strategy - the problems of
identifying, tracing, and possibly litigating the make-up of a some-
times-fluctuating group of measuring lives. The expiration of a per-
missible vesting period measured by a flat period of years is
litigation-free, easy to determine, and unmistakable.
C. The Deferred-Reformation Feature
By design, the first two features of the Uniform Act not only
Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, 20 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 703.1, at 7-26 n.18 (1986).
17. Uniform Act, supra note 1, § l(a)(2); Oregon enactment, supra note 2, § l(l)(b).
18. Briefly, the derivation of the 90-year period is premised on the proposition that
the youngest measuring life, which is the one likely to live the longest, normally would be
the transferor's youngest descendant in being at the transferor's death. Using four hypo-
thetical families deemed to be representative of actual families, it was determined that, on
average, the transferor's youngest descendant in being at the transferor's death - assuming
the transferor's death to occur between ages 60 and 90, which is when 73% of the popula-
tion dies - is about 6 years old. Waggoner, supra note 16, 703.4, at 7-17. The remaining
life expectancy of a 6-year-old is about 69 years. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1986, Table 108, at 69 (106th ed. 1985). The 69 years, plus
the 21-year tack-on period, gives a permissible vesting period of 90 years. For further
elaboration, see Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Ration-
ale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988).
19. The term "standard perpetuity saving clause" refers to one in which the descend-
ants of the transferor (or of an ancestor of the transferor) in being at the creation of the
trust (either by direct designation or by virtue of a designation of the beneficiaries of the
trust then in being), plus 21 years, are used to measure a period of time that provides an
adequate margin of safety in which to allow the contingencies in the trust's future interests
to work out harmlessly.
Almost all family-oriented trusts, at som4 point, create a beneficial interest in favor of
a multiple-generation class such as the transferor's descendants or issue. If the transferor
has no descendants or issue, a family-oriented trust likely will be for the benefit of a collat-
eral line of descent (such as descendants of the transferor's parents). There is no reason to
think that the age of the youngest descendant, on average, in a collateral line would be
appreciably different from the age of the 6-year-old descendant of the transferor upon
whose remaining life expectancy the 90-year permissible vesting period of the Uniform Act
is built. See supra note 18.
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eliminate the injustice inherent in the invalidating side of the com-
mon-law Rule but do so without litigation. The litigation-free
character of these features is thus in accord with one of the main
objectives of the Uniform Act, that is, elimination of perpetuity
cases of the wasteful or nonpurposive variety.
No perpetuity reform can eliminate purposive perpetuity cases.
When the actual post-creation events do not resolve the contingen-
cies within the permissible vesting period, litigation becomes una-
voidable. Thus, application of the third principal feature of the Act
- the deferred-reformation feature - will require litigation (or
court approval of a settlement). But application of the deferred-
reformation feature will be infrequent, and when it happens the liti-
gation will be of the purposive variety. Under the deferred-refor-
mation feature, a contingent (nonvested) future interest (or power
of appointment) that is subject to the wait-and-see element and that
does not work out validly within the ninety-year period becomes
invalid but is subject to reformation to make it valid.20
Application of the deferred-reformation feature will be infre-
quent. Of the fraction of trusts and other property arrangements
that are incompetently drafted, and thus fail to meet the common-
law requirements for initial validity,2' almost all of them will have
terminated by their own terms long before a right to reformation
arises. If, against the odds, a right to reformation does arise, it will
be found easier than perhaps anticipated to determine how best to
reform the disposition.22 The court is given two criteria with which
to work: (i) the transferor's manifested plan of distribution, and (ii)
the allowable ninety-year period. Because governing instruments
are where transferors manifest their plans of distribution, the imag-
inary horror of courts being forced to probe the minds of long-dead
transferors will not materialize.23
20. Uniform Act, supra note 1, § 3; Oregon enactment, supra note 2, § 3.
21. Remember that reformation is permitted only for dispositions that would have
been invalid at common law. A disposition that complies with the common-law Rule is
permitted fully to run its course without the interference of a reformation suit, even if the
term of the trust exceeds 90 years. In other words, if a reformation suit is brought, a
defense against it would be that the disposition did not violat.e the common-law Rule in the
first place.
22. Note that reformation under Section 3 is mandatory, not up to the discretion of
the court. Consequently, as noted in the Official Comment to Section 3, the common-law
doctrine of infectious invalidity is superseded by the Act.
23. The Official Comment to section 3 of the Uniform Act authoritatively discusses
and illustrates the manner in which trusts or other property arrangements should be re-
formed. See also infra text accompanying notes 32, 33.
1990]
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The theory of the Act is to defer the right to reformation until
reformation becomes truly necessary. The basic rule is that the
right to reformation does not arise until there is an invalidity,
which does not occur until the expiration of the ninety-year permis-
sible vesting period. Because almost all trusts and other property
arrangements will have terminated by their own terms long before
the expiration of the ninety years, the deferred approach to refor-
mation substantially reduces the potential number of reformation
suits and thereby limits perpetuity litigation to purposive cases. It
also is consistent with the saving-clause principle embraced by the
Act. Deferring the right to reformation until the permissible vest-
ing period expires is the only way to grant every reasonable oppor-
tunity for the donor's disposition to work itself out without
premature interference.24
II. SAMPLE RECENT PERPETUITY CASES
To bring the above features of the Uniform Act into concrete
focus, I propose now to examine a few recent perpetuity cases. The
cases arose in non-Uniform Act jurisdictions. As I shall demon-
strate, the cases would not have arisen had they been governed by
the Act, for the Act basically establishes a "judicial hands-off" ap-
proach on perpetuity questions. The Act provides a nearly litiga-
tion-free environment insofar as perpetuity matters are concerned.
A. Merrill v. Wimmer 2- - A Case of Injustice and Wasteful
Perpetuity Litigation
The Facts. The facts of Merrill v. Wimmer present a type of
perpetuity violation thought to be quite common - an age contin-
gency in excess of twenty-one relating to grandchildren.
Newell M. Merrill died, leaving a will that created a residuary
trust. The terms of the trust were that the income was to be di-
vided among Newell's three children - Judith, Dennis, and Walter
- during the term of the trust. The trust was to terminate, in part,
"when my youngest grandchild reaches the age of twenty-five (25)
years."
24. At the same time, the Act is not inflexible. It grants the right to reformation
before the expiration of the 90-year permissible vesting period when it becomes necessary to
do so or when there is no point in waiting that period out. The details of this feature of the
reformation section are discussed in the Official Comment to section 3 of the Uniform Act,
supra note 1, and in Waggoner, supra note 5, at 597-98.
25. 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985).
[Vol. 26:259
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Newell was survived by his three adult children - Judith,
Dennis, and Walter - and by seven grandchildren ranging in ages
from eleven to twenty-nine.
The Holding. The court. held that Newell's residuary trust vio-
lated the Rule Against Perpetuities and was invalid, causing the
estate to pass by intestate succession. The ground for the invalidity
was that it was possible that Newell's youngest grandchild might be
born after Newell's death (and hence would not himself or herself
be a life in being) and might reach age twenty-five more than
twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of Newell's
three children and seven grandchildren who were lives in being.
In actual fact, Newell's trust was a quite reasonable one. Com-
mon experience tells us that parents routinely live to see all their
children reach the age of twenty-five. It is very likely that Judith,
Dennis, and Walter, who were in being at Newell's death, all will
live to celebrate the twenty-fifth birthday of their youngest child
(Newell's youngest grandchild). It is even more likely that the
twenty-fifth birthday of Newell's youngest grandchild will occur
during the life of (or within twenty-one years after the death of) at
least one of the three children and seven grandchildren who were
alive at Newell's death, the youngest of whom was then eleven
years old.
To say this in "perpetuity language," it is very likely that the
remainder interests would vest within a life in being, and it is a near
certainty that they would vest within a life in being plus twenty-one
years.
The point is that Newell Merrill's intent was totally defeated,
not because the terms of his trust were unreasonable, but because
he happened to pick a lawyer who failed to insert an appropriate
perpetuity saving clause into his will. The court itself acknowl-
edged as much, by noting: "The generally recognized method of
avoiding total defeat of the testator's general plan is by means of a
savings clause in the will itself, which unfortunately was not pro-
vided here."'26 The failure to provide an appropriate perpetuity sav-
ing clause was the fatal feature of Newell's residuary trust, not the
terms of the trust itself.
The Uniform Act. Had Newell Merrill's trust contained a
perpetuity saving clause, the trust would have been valid under the
Act. In the absence of such a clause, the Act would have provided
26. 481 N.E.2d at 1298-99 n.2.
1990]
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the trust the advantages of one. Without litigation, the easy-to-ad-
minister permissible vesting period would have assured that his in-
tent would not have been defeated.
No Merrill-type trust, created under Oregon law on or after
January 1, 1990, will ever disgrace the Oregon state reports.
B. Pound v. Shorter 27 - Another Case of Injustice and
Wasteful Perpetuity Litigation
The Facts. Pound v. Shorter entails the classic unborn-widow
problem, a problem much discussed in the perpetuity literature.
Elizabeth Shorter died in 1929. Her will created a trust to pay the
income to her son for life, then income to her son's wife for her life,
then corpus to the descendants of Elizabeth's brother and sister.
The son died in 1987, survived by his wife. The trustee filed a peti-
tion to determine the validity of the trust under the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities, followed in Georgia.
The Holding. The court upheld the trial court's determination
that Elizabeth's trust violated the common-law Rule because it was
possible that the son's wife might not have been in being in 1929,
when the trust was created.
The actual facts were that the son married in 1953 and died in
1987. The son's wife was in fact "in being" in 1929, when his
mother, Elizabeth, died.28 Thus, the court defeated Elizabeth
Shorter's intention on the ground of a remotely possible post-crea-
tion event that at the time of the lawsuit was known not to have
happened.
If Elizabeth's will had only included a standard perpetuity sav-
ing clause, her intention would not have been defeated. More im-
portantly, no lawsuit questioning the trust's validity would have
been necessary.
The Uniform Act. The Uniform Act would have provided
Elizabeth Shorter's trust the advantages of a perpetuity saving
clause. Her estate would not have been subject to costly litigation
and her intention would have been carried out unchallenged.
After January 1, 1990, the Uniform Act ensures that no unap-
27. 377 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 1989).
28. The court's opinion does not indicate this, but a letter from one of the attorneys
in the case to Professor Waggoner states that she was in being in 1929, when the testatrix
died. Letter from J. Warren Ott, of the Atlanta law firm of King & Spaulding, to Lawrence
Waggoner (July 13, 1989).
[Vol. 26:259
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pealing cases such as Pound v. Shorter ever will appear in the Ore-
gon state reports. Nor will such a case appear in the Georgia
reports, for Georgia-the state whose supreme court decided the
Pound case-subsequently enacted the Uniform Act.
C. Estate of Anderson v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank
29 -
A Just Result, but At the Cost of Wasteful Litigation
The Facts. The facts of Estate of Anderson v. Deposit Guaranty
National Bank are quite simple enough. Charles Anderson's will,
drafted by a lawyer, created a trust to last for twenty-five years
from the date of the admission of the will to probate. The income
was to be used for the education of the descendants of Charles'
father. The trust was to terminate at the end of the twenty-five-
year period, at which time the trust corpus was payable to Charles'
nephew, Howard Davis, or, if Howard was not then living, to the
heirs of Howard's body.
Charles Anderson, a childless bachelor, died in 1984. He had
a brother and a sister, but they predeceased him. Charles was sur-
vived by his brother's four children and six grandchildren; and by
his sister's child and four grandchildren. In all, fifteen descendants
of Charles' parents survived Charles.
Violation of Common-law Rule. Charles' trust violated the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. The reason was that the
contingent remainder in the corpus might not vest within a life in
being plus twenty-one years because all fifteen of the surviving de-
scendants might die within four years after Charles' death!
The Actual Holding. The Supreme Court of Mississippi ex-
pressed grave impatience with the fact that the common-law Rule
would strike down this quite reasonable trust. The court took two
bold steps to avoid that result: The court judicially adopted the
wait-and-see method, using causal-relation lives; 30 and the court
29. 541 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1989).
30. The use of the "causal-relationship" formula may breed litigation in future Mis-
sissippi perpetuity cases. See supra note 13. Nevertheless, a judicial adoption of wait-and-
see cannot be expected to forego the use of actual measuring lives to measure the permissi-
ble vesting period.
A striking feature of the Anderson case is how closely the facts fit the rationale of the
90-year period of the Uniform Act. The youngest measuring life under the actual-measur-
ing-lives approach to wait-and-see and under standard perpetuity saving clauses is likely to
be the transferor's youngest descendant living at the transferor's death (or, in the Anderson
case, the youngest descendant of the transferor's parents). See Waggoner, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CoR-
1990]
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sanctioned reformation by means of judicially inserting a perpetuity
saving clause into the instrument.
The Mississippi Supreme Court is to be commended for devel-
oping a solution that upheld Charles' trust without any change in
its terms. Charles' intent was not defeated or altered in any way.
Case-by-case adjudication had its costs, however: the cost of the
lawsuit and the appeal all the way to the state supreme court.
Uniform Act. Had the Anderson case been governed by the
Uniform Act, Charles Anderson's quite reasonable trust would
have gone into effect as he intended, the trust would now be using
the income for the education of the descendants of his father as he
intended (without any possible deduction of lawyer's fees to pay for
both sides of a perpetuity challenge), and at the end of the twenty-
five year period the corpus would be distributed.
After January 1, 1990, no Oregon lawyers will collect fees to
argue different sides of a case such as Anderson. No Oregon court
ever will hear of a perpetuity problem in such a trust.
D. Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co.3 -
A Case of Injustice and Wasteful Perpetuity Litigation;
A Possible Future Reformation Suit
The Facts. Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust
Co. is a more complicated case than the others. George H.C. Ar-
rowsmith died in 1983, leaving a will dated July 29, 1982. George's
NELL L. REV. 157, 166 & n. 30 (1988). In the approximation used by the Uniform Act to
develop the 90-year period, the youngest measuring life, on average, was taken to be about
6 years old. The Act derived 90 years by adding 21 years to the 69 years of remaining
statistical life expectancy of a 6-year-old (21 + 69 = 90). See supra note 18.
The Anderson court identified the measuring lives as the beneficiaries of the trust -
the descendants of the testator's father living at the testator's death. The youngest of these
descendants was Drake Robertson, a one-year-old grandson of the testator's deceased
brother.
If young Drake Robertson lives out his statistical life expectancy of 74.6 years (see
Table 109 of the 1989 Statistical Abstract of the United States), and if the 21-year period
following his death is added in, which the court indicated it would do (see 541 So. 2d, at
431), the permissible vesting period marked off in the Anderson case would turn out to be
about 96 years. Note also that this would be about the same margin-of-safety period of
time that a standard perpetuity saving clause would have produced.
Of course, the actual trust in Anderson will last only 25 years. The fact that the per-
missible vesting period adopted by the court is in the high 90s, and the fact that the Uni-
form Act marks off a 90-year period for all cases, will not make the trust in Anderson last
longer than 25 years. It just means that there will be a quite long, quite harmless, and quite
ignored unused end-portion of the permissible period.
31. 313 Md. 334, 545 A.2d 674 (1988).
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1982 will, drafted by a lawyer, expressly revoked all prior wills and
exercised a testamentary power of appointment over some $7 mil-
lion in assets of an irrevocable inter-vivos trust created by his
mother in 1953.
By his will, George exercised his power of appointment by cre-
ating a trust. Most of the corpus of that trust was to be held for
George's three children - Edith Ann (born in 1959), Jeffrey (born
in 1961), and Stephen (born in 1962). At George's death, therefore,
Edith Ann was about twenty-four years old, Jeffrey was about
twenty-two, and Stephen was about twenty-one. None had chil-
dren of their own.
George's trust did not grant the children a right to the income
from their respective shares. Rather, the trustee was given the dis-
cretionary power to pay the income to them or accumulate it; and
the trustee also was given the discretionary power to invade the
corpus of each child's share for the child's support and
maintenance.
Upon the death of each child, that child's share was to be di-
vided among that child's then-living descendants, per stirpes; if
none was then living, then to that child's then-living brothers or
sisters, with the share of any deceased brother or sister going to
that sibling's then-living descendants, per stirpes.
The Actual Holding. The Maryland court invoked the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities and held the remainder inter-
ests in the corpus of each child's share to be invalid. In addition,
the trustee's discretionary powers over income and corpus also
were invalid. In result, the court held that George's trust was en-
tirely invalid, and the property was ordered distributed outright to
each child in one-third shares. George's intention was fully
defeated.
Uniform Act. The application of the Uniform Act to this case
is simplicity itself. No immediate litigation would have been re-
quired, and more than likely no litigation ever would be required.
The trust would have gone into effect as written, with the discre-
tionary powers of the trustee fully operable for up to sixty years.
3 2
Remember the ages of George's children at his death: Edith
32. At common law, and under the Uniform Act, the perpetuity period begins run-
ning when George's mother created the original trust, in 1953. Uniform Act, supra note 1,
§ 2; Oregon enactment, supra note 2, § 2. Under the Uniform Act, this would mean that, as
of George's death in 1983, sixty years would remain of the permissible vesting period before
any interest or power in the trust would become invalid and subject to reformation.
1990]
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was twenty-four, Jeffrey was twenty-two, and Stephen was twenty-
one. Add sixty years to their ages and you get age eighty-four for
Edith, age eighty-two for Jeffrey, and age eighty-one for Stephen.
Edith's share would be valid and distributed to her descendants if
she dies at age eighty-four or under; Jeffrey's share would be valid
and distributed to his descendants if he dies at eighty-two or under;
Stephen's share would be valid and distributed to his descendants if
he dies at eighty-one or under.
If all three children die at or under these ages, no court contact
at all would be required under the Uniform Act. Statistically speak-
ing, each child is more likely than not to die under these ages, given
that life expectancy now is seventy-five years on average. This is
not to suggest, of course, that it is not possible for one, two, or all
three of these children to live beyond their low eighties.
Deferred Reformation Under the Uniform Act. Because there
is a possibility in this case that judicial intervention really would
become necessary, I now turn to that possibility to see how the
deferred-reformation feature of the Uniform Act would operate.
Suppose, then, that Stephen lives beyond eighty-one. A reforma-
tion suit then would be in order as to Stephen's share.
How would the court reform? The reformation section of the
Uniform Act requires the court to be guided by the transferor's
"manifested plan of distribution."33  Transferors manifest their
plans of distribution in the language of the instrument. The written
terms of the trust will provide the guidance as to how to reform "in
the manner that most closely approximates the transferor's mani-
fested plan of distribution," within the constraint of vesting all in-
terests within the permissible vesting period.
One of the advantages of a Uniform Act is that the Official
Comments give guidance to courts in a variety of cases. As to a
case such as Arrowsmith, the court would find considerable gui-
dance in those Comments. In fact, Example (2) in the Comment to
section 3 is nearly exactly on point. The Court will find that Ste-
phen is like "Z" in that example. Working under that example, the
court should be willing to approve the following modifications to
the terms of Stephen's share:
(1) the court will eliminate the trustee's discretionary power
over the income and corpus as of the expiration of the permissible
33. Uniform Act, supra note 1, § 3; Oregon enactment, supra note 2, § 3.
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vesting period, probably substituting for Stephen a vested right to
the income for the remainder of his life; and
(2) the court will vest the remainder interest in the corpus of
Stephen's share in his descendants, per stirpes, who are living as of
the expiration of the permissible vesting period, with possession
delayed until Stephen dies (which should not be very many more
years).
III. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Act eliminates the injustice caused by the com-
mon-law's approach of invalidating interests because of what might
happen, shifts the test of invalidity to what actually happens, and
creates a nearly litigation-free environment insofar as perpetuity
matters are concerned. Under the Uniform Act, dispositions such
as involved in Merrill v. Wimmer, Pound v. Shorter, Estate of An-
derson, and Arrowsmith disappear from the adjudicative scene.
Like the Merrill, Pound, and Anderson trusts, most trusts, by far,
will terminate by their own terms far short of the expiration of the
vesting period permitted by the Act and never will need to be liti-
gated. This limits perpetuity litigation to the purposive variety,
which for the most part confines perpetuity litigation to those few
cases in which the permissible vesting period actually is exceeded
and reformation is truly necessary.34
The Uniform Act achieves the objective of eliminating waste-
ful, nonpurposive perpetuity litigation. This is one of the Act's
great strengths. Under the wait-and-see/deferred-reformation ap-
proach of the Uniform Act, almost none of the perpetuity cases
that have ever been litigated in this country would have been
litigated.
34. Under the Act, events might cause the Arrowsmith trust to be this type of a case
in the future; but the actual round of litigation that arose in that case was premature and
would not have arisen under the Uniform Act. An occasional purposive case with
perpetuity overtones also can arise in a different context. An example would be where the
constructional preference for validity plays a part in resolving an ambiguity that would
have had to be resolved no matter what perpetuity law or perpetuity reform is in effect.
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